Abstract
As platforms have access to more users' data, platforms can know better about users' preferences. In this case, how would users choose a platform? Can platforms convey informative messages by cheap‐talk advertising? Our analytical model suggests that in the case of strong reputation concern, users prefer a known biased platform without reputation concern rather than an unknown platform. Because this unknown platform is more likely to recommend products that help the platform earn reputation, regardless of users' preferences. In semi‐separating equilibria, the unbiased platform truthfully reports its type while the biased platform mixes message on type report.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callSimilar Papers
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
