Abstract

The belief-bias effect is one of the most-studied biases in reasoning. A recent study of the phenomenon using the signal detection theory (SDT) model called into question all theoretical accounts of belief bias by demonstrating that belief-based differences in the ability to discriminate between valid and invalid syllogisms may be an artifact stemming from the use of inappropriate linear measurement models such as analysis of variance (Dube et al., Psychological Review, 117(3), 831–863, 2010). The discrepancy between Dube et al.’s, Psychological Review, 117(3), 831–863 (2010) results and the previous three decades of work, together with former’s methodological criticisms suggests the need to revisit earlier results, this time collecting confidence-rating responses. Using a hierarchical Bayesian meta-analysis, we reanalyzed a corpus of 22 confidence-rating studies (N = 993). The results indicated that extensive replications using confidence-rating data are unnecessary as the observed receiver operating characteristic functions are not systematically asymmetric. These results were subsequently corroborated by a novel experimental design based on SDT’s generalized area theorem. Although the meta-analysis confirms that believability does not influence discriminability unconditionally, it also confirmed previous results that factors such as individual differences mediate the effect. The main point is that data from previous and future studies can be safely analyzed using appropriate hierarchical methods that do not require confidence ratings. More generally, our results set a new standard for analyzing data and evaluating theories in reasoning. Important methodological and theoretical considerations for future work on belief bias and related domains are discussed.

Highlights

  • The ability to draw necessary conclusions from given information constitutes one of the building blocks of

  • believability of the conclusion (Belief) are often misguided and logical reasoning is necessary to determine if and when this is the case. These detriments are likely to be far reaching in our lives, as highlighted by early work focusing on the socialpsychological implications of belief bias (e.g., Feather, 1964; Kaufmann & Goldstein, 1967)

  • To make matters worse these distortions are asymptotic in the sense that they would not vanish by having more data. They only reinforce the distorted results. These results show that a scenario in which the rejection of equal-variance SDT (EVSDT) is driven by the use of heterogeneous stimuli is far from unlikely, given that there is substantial variability in the propensity to accept different syllogistic structures all classified as complex (Evans et al, 1999)

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Summary

Conclusion

Note that this erroneous conclusion does not vanish by collecting more data—additional data will only reinforce the conclusion, an aspect that can lead researchers to a false sense of reassurance.

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