Abstract
ABSTRACTThe main focus of this paper is on a Shapley value for multichoice games introduced by van den Nouweland et al. (ZOR–Math. Meth. Oper. Res. 41 : 289–311, 1995). Here we provide several characterizations from traditional game theory and redefine them in the framework of multichoice games. Meanwhile, the relationship between core and this Shapley value for multichoice games is discussed. When multichoice games are convex, this Shapley value is a multichoice population monotonic allocation scheme (MPMAS).
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