Abstract
Market equilibria are difficult to describe in markets with network effects because they often involve an upward sloping demand curve and/or multiple equilibria. In the framework of symmetric Cournot oligopoly, I investigate for a minimal set of conditions and thus extend the standard equilibrium analysis by Amir (Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 15 (1996), pp. 132–148) and Amir and Lambson (Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 67 (2000), pp. 235–254) to these kinds of markets.
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