Abstract
This article aims to theorise corruption from a “macro” perspective. It elaborates upon a range of social sciences literatures, notably from criminology and political sciences, that have discussed various “macro”-level factors contributing to corruption, including market characteristics. Its most distinct contribution to the literature is in importing the concept of “systemic risk” – thus far chiefly examined in the financial regulation literature – to the analysis of corruption. It draws on the financial literature on systemic risk and macro-prudential regulation and supervision. In so doing, it elaborates upon concepts such as “network” and “contagion” as to theorise the effects of corruption on resource allocation. This is supplemented by reference to the legal canon of literature on market regulation.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
