Abstract
Ibn Taymiyya's view of the human act has received considerably more scholarly attention than other aspects of his theology. While Ibn Taymiyya does employ the philosophical language of secondary causality, this chapter shows that these causes are not efficacious but only instruments in God's acts of creation. Furthermore, Ibn Taymiyya argues, human disobedience occurs for lack of human will, not for lack of power, and not because God knew it would occur. The chapter has shown that Ibn Taymiyya uses several different terms to set out a view of God's creation of human agency that is essentially that of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī in its metaphysical structure and that has its roots in the causal language of philosophers like Ibn Sīnā. Ibn Taymiyya portrays his compatibilism positively as the golden mean between the extremes of the Jabrīs and the Qadarīs, between hard determinism and libertarian freedom.Keywords: Acts; Creation; God's creation; human act; human agency; Human Agent; Ibn Taymiyya
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