Chapter Eight. Motion And Reason: Hobbes’ Difficulties With The Idea Of Active Power

Abstract

In brief, the notion of active power in the ?scientific? metaphysics Hobbes aimed at building is reduced to the motion of bodies conceived as causes of other motions. This chapter argues that Hobbes did not succeed in the attempt to eliminate from his kinematist metaphysics the idea of active power in the strong sense, understood as a capacity of being and acting ?in itself ?. Hobbes? kinematist theory can be seen to fail also in giving an account of the activity of human reason. It seems evident that what Hobbes describes as ?ratiocination? involves active operations of reason in the strong sense of being causally independent of sensations and other bodily affections. The tacit presumption that humans are able to act freely, by their own power alone, becomes particularly obvious in Hobbes? description of the sovereign as an independent and unlimited agent in political life. Keywords: active power; human reason; kinematist metaphysics; motion of bodies; ratiocination; Thomas Hobbes