Abstract
AbstractThis chapter argues that all belief calls for justification and that, accordingly, a normative reason for a belief must justify or be positively relevant to the justification of that belief. This is explained in terms of the idea that belief constitutively aims at truth. It is argued (a) that while normative reasons for action must favour or recommend the action, they may do so merely by giving an instrumental point to the action, and (b) that it is far from clear that all intentional action calls for justification in anything like the sense in which beliefs call for justification. The classical view that intentional action constitutively aims at the good is rejected on the grounds that it does not square with the possibility of deeply perverse action. The relation between motivating and normative reasons for belief or action is discussed.
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