Abstract
It is disclosed that in the contacts between the Secretary-General with both the SRSG and President Habyarimana about the political deadlock and the failure to install the government, Boutros-Ghali's response consisted mainly of a threat to withdraw United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) when no improvement was seen. This was exactly what the extremists wanted to hear. This chapter substantiates this observation with an explanation of the events in Rwanda and the subsequent reactions of U.N. headquarters in New York during the months of January, February and March 1994. In the second half of January, the security situation deteriorated rapidly. The ultimate threat given by New York to Habyarimana was a possible withdrawal of UNAMIR. Everything was based on both the Arusha Agreement and the classic peace-keeping force, UNAMIR, which was the only means of achieving the implementation of the Accords.Keywords: Arusha peace agreements; New York; political deadlock; security situation; UNAMIR
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