Chapter 1 - Philosophical Foundations

Abstract

This chapter draws heavily on the philosophical issues involved with artificial intelligence (AI). The main objective of this chapter is to sketch three AI models—symbol-system AI, connectionist AI, and artificial life—based on visions of the mind and to highlight the specific philosophical and cognitive scientific questions to which they give rise. The mind-brain identity theory, which is used to vindicate naturalism and materialism, in its strongest form, claims that the types of mental states are identical to the types of brain states. Thus, to feel pain or some other related cognitive function is to be identified with being in some specific neural state. But this leads rapidly to an uncomfortable kind of species chauvinism because there is no reason to suppose that a being lacking neurons but equipped with a silicon brain could not feel pain or have some other ability. Thus, a simple and satisfying view has it that AI vindicates the basic claims of the materialist-naturalist. This also raises some questions concerning the proper understanding of the key concepts of representation and symbol, the nature of the implementation-program dichotomy, and the precise relationship among the gross mentalistic discourse and the inner representation manipulating events. In conclusion, the author highlights that the complexity of ideas that once defined the field are being challenged from several angles. The emerging alternative demands new conceptualizations of almost all the key terms. At the heart of this new understanding will be a much better appreciation of the delicate balance among the initial structure, the external environment, and the dependable effects of bombardment by ecologically realistic stimuli.