Chapitre 2. Care beyond autonomy: The recognition of our vulnerable capabilities

Abstract

The use of the category of vulnerability has been multiplied in moral philosophy social sciences and bioethics. Being vulnerable can refer rhetorically to all mortal agents, but also to those lacking agency which makes of it a very ambiguous notion. The notion of vulnerability is part of everyday language and is mostly perceived as a determination which limits our aspirations to autonomy. Why has it become a notion a bioethical principle or concept per se? Historically, anthropology of the vulnerable subject is needed and can be found in the work of Nussbaum and Honneth which could be used in bioethical discourse. The link between care theory and capability of recognition theories developed by Sen and Nussbaum, enrich the picture. Vulnerability we will argue does not have to be from an anthropological point of view, exposition to dependence and exploitation.