Abstract

A new set of model equations is proposed to describe the evolution of the arms race, by extending Richardson's model with special emphases that (1) power dependent defensive reaction or historical enmity could be a motive force to promote armaments, (2) a deterrent would suppress the growth of armaments, and (3) the defense reaction of one nation against the other nation depends nonlinearly on the difference in armaments between two. The set of equations is numerically solved to exhibit stationary, periodic, and chaotic behavior depending on the combinations of parameters involved. The chaotic evolution is realized when the economic situation of each country involved in the arms race is quite different, which is often observed in the real world. (c) 1998 American Institute of Physics.

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