Channel Modeling: From West Point Cadet to General

Abstract

The U.S. Army and Air Force are two of many organizations that are characterized as meritocracies, where career advancement is supposed to be determined mostly by one's ability to achieve institutional goals. Critics have long claimed, however, that promotion in a meritocracy is inevitably affected by factors separate from competence (Young, 1958). Moore and Trout (1978) contrast performance theory, which says that promotion in the military goes to those who perform best, with their preferred theory, which stresses the importance of being seen and known and of having contacts with peers and mentors who can influence one's upward mobility. We examine military rank attainment of a West Point class, evaluating the importance of men's assets in attaining their highest promotion: lieutenant colonel, colonel, or ascending grades of general. The most salient aspect of visibility is literally how one looks. Atkinson refers to the lantern jaw and chiseled features prized in military (1981). A fictitious first captain at West Point, created by an academy graduate, is described thus: He had one of those young Gregory Peck faces, the dark handsome good looks of a born general. It had always seemed there was an unwritten requirement that first captains and other high-ranking cadets be attractive...not just good looking, but...idols. Statues to the American idea of cadet.... At 6[feet]1[inch], 185 pounds, a letterman in soccer and lacrosse, he was the ideal first captain. There was a certain awkwardness - intimidation - in his presence (Truscott, 1978; 414). Do looks really influence promotion? We also examine the structure of the promotion process because it became clear to us that whether or not one attends military staff college and war college are important branch points that affect one's subsequent chance for promotion. These schools serve as gates, passing or removing aspirants for top positions (Rosenbaum, 1984). In other words, there are running through the military promotion system, shunting some men into retirement as lieutenant colonels (a relatively low rank for a West Point graduate), while others flow forward until they are either diverted to the middle level of the hierarchy or continue upward into the pool of candidates for general officer. Our emphasis on visibility features and promotion channels does not deny the relevance of personal ability and effort, which are clearly important for military promotion. Instead we suggest that consideration of visibility and channels provides a more complete explanation of the promotion process and its outcomes. Military Careers of a West Point Class Cadets of the West Point class of 1950 all received the rank of second lieutenant upon graduation and most entered one of the Army's several branches (e.g., infantry, engineers) while 25 percent were authorized to go into the Air Force. About half participated in the Korean War, which began only weeks after graduation, and most of the others joined the Cold War in Europe. Within three years, 8 percent of the class members were dead. By 1956, 17 percent of the class had resigned, and by 1964 another 5 percent had done so, for various reasons including attractive jobs outside the Army, family considerations, and dissatisfaction with a military career (Butler, 1971). Nearly all of those who remained in the military through the 1950s stayed for 20 years (or more) in order to retire with benefits. Promotion of young officers is nearly automatic through the rank of captain, being determined primarily by amount of time served, although more rapid advance can come in wartime situations such as Korea. Most young officers earn advanced degrees and seek a variety of assignments in command and staff positions, and in combat zones if there is a war, obtaining broad experience that is considered necessary for the highest ranks (Atkinson, 1989). Early promotion to the rank of major is regarded as an indication of special merit. …