Changing the Institutional Framework of Statutory Audit: Internal Stakeholders' Perceptions of the Associated Benefit and Costs

Abstract

This paper analyses the expected benefits and costs associated with changes to the institutional framework of statutory audits. We focus on five changes: Mandatory external audit firm rotation, auditor appointment by an independent regulator, a general ban on providing non-audit services, a ban on providing non-audit services to audit clients, and mandatory joint audits. We survey supervisory board members and management representatives from German companies to analyse how these changes affect the following beneficial attributes: Client-specific expertise and knowledge, general professional competence and expertise, independence and professional scepticism, and reputation. Our results show that none of the proposed changes is expected to increase the benefit of audits. A ban on non-audit services to audit clients is perceived to have the least disadvantageous effect, followed by a general ban on non-audit services, mandatory external audit firm rotation, appointment by an independent regulator, and mandatory joint audits. Although all changes are expected to increase auditor independence and professional scepticism, this increase is offset by a decrease in other beneficial attributes, particularly client-specific expertise and knowledge. Compared to supervisory board members, management representatives anticipate significantly larger decreases in the benefit of audits and significantly larger increases in costs.