Abstract
This paper reports on an experiment conducted at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania, testing a new mechanism for matching students to schedules of courses. The experiment compared Budish’s (2011) approximate competitive equilibrium from equal incomes (CEEI) to the incumbent, a fake-money auction used by Wharton and numerous other professional schools. CEEI outperformed the auction on quantitative measures of efficiency and fairness and qualitative measures of perceived strategic simplicity and student satisfaction. The experiment succeeded in the Roth (1986) sense of “whispering in the ears of princes”, persuading the Wharton administration to adopt CEEI and guiding real-world implementation.
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