Abstract
Lafont argues for a participatory version of deliberative democracy that shares key features with other contemporary approaches, while departing from them in decisive ways. It is based on the Rousseauian–Kantian idea of democratic self-legislation, interpreted as the idea that citizens must be able to see themselves as the authors of the laws and public policies to which they are subject. She insists that her specification of the ideal of democratic self-legislation is a general one, aiming to appeal to readers with different understandings of the core democratic values of equality, freedom and democratic control. This is questionable. I show that she interprets the democratic ideal of freedom as a distinctive, normatively robust conception of citizen self-determination. Those drawn to travel with her on the long participatory road should be aware of this and ready to explore the implications. By downplaying the distinctiveness and normative robustness of her idea of freedom, she does her model a disservice.
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