Changes in the Westphalian Order: Territory, Public Authority, and Sovereignty

Abstract

nature of concepts. All concepts are abstract. Indeed, root of word means to draw out or away from what Harry Eckstein called the relentless particularity of experience. Concepts attempt to draw together elements of concrete experience that can be grouped in a fruitful way, so as to improve our understanding. Thus, point is not to avoid abstraction, but to build fruitful concepts. Again, no one will disagree with so anodyne a statement. The challenge is to pitch concepts at right level so as to connect both upward (towards general theory) and downward (towards empirical data). The mix of concepts associated with Westphalian order (sovereignty, authority, autonomy, control, territoriality) have fallen on latter criterion, that is, on connection between abstract concepts and empirical observations. Dichotomous nature of concepts. Concepts such as and territoriality have been treated as if they could take on two possible values-present or absent, or not sovereign, territorial or nonterritorial organization. While some concepts are inherently dichotomous, many so treated are at bottom continuous. Even types of political systems, such as presidential and parliamentary, can be conceptualized as having or less of these properties measured on some underlying continuum (Shugart and Carey 1992:2-3). Defining our concepts in either/or terms has caused us to labor needlessly about whether certain states are or not, whether emerging international unions such as European Union (EU) possess or not, and if they do, whether such is shared with constituent nation states. Dichotomous conceptions of have also prevented us from conceptualizing sovereignty bargains (Litfin 1997). Disputes over and who possesses it are bound up with notion that is ultimate right to decide. Sovereignty in this sense implies a hierarchy of both 4 Changes in Westphalian Order 5 norms and power. Many institutions within (and outside) society may possess both competencies and normative support, but when they are in conflict with one another-when the chips are down as saying goes-the important question is who has final authority? Since ideas of normative conflict and hierarchy of norms are central to much legal reasoning, lawyers tend to adopt this view of as located in final authority. Since law is about adjudication among competing norms, lawyers are supremely well placed to shed light on so defined. Yet idea of as ultimate right to decide has seriously retarded progress. Dichotomous conceptions of do not allow much observable variation, cannot be untangled from other important concepts, and are not easily assimilated into language of political exchange (compromising sovereignty, bargains) and practices. Almost all of concepts related to Westphalian model-territory, control over borders, authority, autonomy, legitimacy, and sovereignty-can be thought of in continuous terms. While phrases such as more or less sovereign may sound odd, I suggest they do so because of ingrained notion that is ultimate right to decide. While this point is straightforward, it is not uncontroversial, and finding areas of agreement with respect to definitions is an important first step. The aggregation of concepts. Concepts such as territoriality, sovereignty, and authority obviously exist at a very high level of aggregation. To some extent, this is unavoidable. We are dealing with macroconcepts that often cannot be factored into specific, microlevel representations. Anarchy is a structural characteristic of international system, not a characteristic of states. States are not anarchic, yet placed in relation to one another they form an anarchy. And individual states are not bipolar or multipolar but system as a whole may be. Information about components is used to construct systemic properties (how could it be otherwise?), but once assembled in relation to one another, system takes on meanings of its own. Composition counts. The placement of elements makes a difference. Waltz (1979) has gone to great pains to establish independence of thirdimage (systemic) theory. If Waltz is correct-and I think he is on this pointsystemic theory cannot be reduced to its components. A theory of market is different from, and not reducible to, a theory of firms, just as a theory of international relations is separate from a theory of foreign policy.4 Lest I sound as if I am defending what I want to criticize, I note that aggregation issue takes two forms. The first, discussed briefly above, concerns 4This is a separate question from whether systemic theory by itself is underdetermined and therefore requires a theory of foreign policy as a complement.