Changes in Seoul’s North Korean Policy and Implications for Pyongyang’s Inter-Korean Diplomacy

Abstract

After a decade of liberal leadership in South Korea that was accompanied by apparent progress in inter-Korean relations, the political winds shifted in 2008 with the election of Grand National Party (GNP) candidate Lee Myung Bak. It was inevitable that this power transition would bring with it new challenges for inter-Korean relations. Lee’s campaign based on “pragmatism” gave the impression that his administration would generally seek to continue engagement with North Korea along the lines of his predecessors while introducing greater conditionality into South Korea’s relations with the North. This policy came to be known during the 2008 South Korean presidential campaign as Lee’s Denuclearization, Opening, 3000 (DNO 3000) policy. This policy promised to make efforts to raise North Korea’s per capita income to US$3000 if the North abandoned its nuclear weapons and pursued economic opening to the outside world. Although the North refrained from criticizing Lee himself during the campaign period, the likelihood of difficulty in the relationship following his election was not a surprise given the North’s strident criticisms of the GNP. Further complicating the issue, a second inter-Korean summit between Roh Moo Hyun and Kim Jong Il was held and a new inter-Korean agreement was signed in October of 2008, only a little over two months prior to South Korea’s presidential election. Given Roh’s lame-duckstatus, the timing of the summit appeared to be intended to lock in and make irreversible the gains that had been made in inter-Korean relations before a new government came to power. Lee Myung Bak’s inauguration was inevitably accompanied by a reevaluation of inter-Korean relations on both sides of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).