Changes in Integrative Complexity Among Middle East Leaders During the Persian Gulf Crisis

Abstract

Integrative complexity scoring was performed on almost 1250 paragraphs, whose source was the English transcription of materials produced by 14 Middle Eastern leaders between summer of 1990 and March, 1991. The data set was divided by leader, two levels of involvement in the Gulf crisis (high vs. peripheral), two political positions (adherence to pro‐ vs. anti‐Iraqi policies), and seven temporal phases of the crisis (before the invasion of Kuwait, during and shortly after the invasion, diplomatic/economic attempts at solution, the last two weeks before the U.N. deadline for Iraqi withdrawal, aerial counterattack, ground counterattack, and after the cease‐fire). Eight leaders provided sufficient material during at least four of the above phases for reliable scoring. Pro‐ and anti‐Iraq leaders showed complexity changes in opposite directions across most phases of the crisis, except that both sides declined during the attempt to find a peaceful solution (October‐December 1990). Individual changes, with particular attention to Saddam Hussein, are also analyzed. The results are interpreted in terms of cognitive management: the perceived costs and benefits of investing in particular strategies varying in complexity.