Abstract

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of regulatory changes by the US Securities and Exchange Commission in 2000 on private information leakage prior to merger announcements. Design/methodology/approach Using a sample of 5,045 merger announcements between 1990 and 2008, the authors examine differences in information leakage between the pre- and post-regulation period merger announcements for acquirers using regression analysis. Findings The results suggest that regulatory changes have been effective in preventing private information leakage in merger announcements for large- and medium-sized firms, for high-tech firms, and for stock deals. The authors find that abnormal trading volume due to differences in information quality is reduced post-regulation for stock deals, high-tech firms, large- and medium-sized bidders, indicating less leakage of information after the new regulations. The authors find higher announcement returns post-regulation for the entire sample and for all subsamples except stock deals, small firms, and public targets. Higher announcement returns indicate that merger announcements are a greater surprise to the market due to a reduction in leaked private information after the regulatory changes. Practical implications The results have implications on future rule changes, on refinements of insider trading rules, regulation fair disclosure, and regulation M-A. The authors leave for future research why certain types of firms or deals are not impacted by regulatory changes. Originality/value Examine the effect of changes in information environment on merger announcements for acquirers because the impact likely has greater significance on acquirers than that on targets. Past studies have examined only targets.

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