Change of Sovereignty and Concessions

Abstract

The principle of international law as announced by Chief Justice Marshall in the famous Percheman Case and supported by a long list of American decisions is that no confiscation of private property in land results from a mere change of sovereignty. Will this principle be sufficient and adequate to protect private property rights in concessions and contracts? In other words, since contracts no less than land may constitute valuable and irreplaceable private property, should any distinction be made, in the application of the Percheman principle, between land and contracts?Where the parties to the contracts are private persons or corporations there seems to be no essential distinction between property in the form of land and property in the form of contracts. In either case the change of sovereignty must, of itself, effect no forfeiture; where, for instance, territory passes out of the sovereignty of State X and under the sovereignty of State Y, just as State Y must not allow the change of sovereignty to affect the ownership of land held by a private individual, A, within the ceded territory, so State Y must not allow it to affect the ownership of contract rights, held by A against some private obligor or debtor, B.