Challenges in the Taxonomy of Cyber-Physical Security and Trust

Abstract

New defense problems have arisen with the rapid development of cyber physical systems (CPSs). Some bugs, risks, attacks, and checks were added for the latest generation of CPSs. In particular, it has been challenging to research the problem using one generally used model because of the complexity of the elements of CPSs and the different CPS frameworks. The complexity of construction blocks is a fundamental problem for CPS protection. CPS consists of several cases with other materials. Various components such as sensors, actuators, and integrated systems are available. Various device libraries, proprietary and industrial, are now used for regulation and surveillance. Consequently, each element will contribute to a CPS attack and its integration. Recognizing existing bugs, seizures, and defense measures in CPS security would provide us with a greater understanding of CPS security. Therefore, the shortcomings of the CPS should be identified, allowing them to be subject to various attacks and develop ways to protect themselves against attacks. The sophistication of CPSs and the variability of CPS modules have created severe problems for preserving CPS confidentiality and protection. In particular, dynamic cyber-physical relations make it impossible to determine vulnerabilities and risks, and new issues emerge. The attacks that can arise from switching between and threatening numerous CPS components are often brutal, recognized, tracked, and analyzed. An extensive grasp of vulnerability, risks, or attacks is crucial to improving defense mechanisms. Current CPS protection and privacy checks would also help us find missed components, vulnerable connections, and new scans. This chapter will review and systematize recent CPS security analysis in a cohesive context. Three orthogonal coordinates comprise the framework: (1) from the CPS viewpoint, we are looking at electronic, physical, and cyber-physical components; and (2) from the CPS perspective, we are exploring the basic functionality of CPS applications and symbolic systems. From our defense perspective, we follow a familiar taxonomy of risks, bugs, attacks, and monitoring; (e.g., defense and public safety, medical CPS, and blood diagnostics). The model can be abstract to display general element relationships in a CPS framework and detailed to capture any specifics if necessary. This is the purpose of building a sufficiently conceptual model to apply to different heterogeneous CPS application areas and obtain a modular view of the strongly linked CPS elements. This abstract disconnection enables a systemic knowledge of CPS safety and highlights potential points of attack and means of protecting it. This chapter tries to sum up the cutting-edge in CPS protection to inspire the public to investigate this emerging area further. Next, we have a schematic interface modeling algorithm to prevent interaction with devices and increase droplet route costs. Simulated experiments on three experimental parameters show that the design approach suggested results in a compact structure and provides an execution series for efficiently managing cyber-physical DMFB PCR operations.