Abstract

This article highlights challenges associated with securing visible light communication (VLC) systems by using physical layer security (PLS) techniques. Motivated by the achievements in PLS studies for radio frequency (RF) communication, many PLS techniques for VLC systems were also rigorously investigated by tailoring the RF techniques to the VLC environment. However, careful consideration of the inherent differences between RF and VLC systems is still needed. By disregarding these differences, an eavesdropper could be given an opportunity to wiretap the VLC systems, even when PLS techniques are employed to protect them. Crucially, the fact that it is often not possible to know the number and locations of eavesdroppers in real VLC systems may allow eavesdroppers to devise various cooperative eavesdropping methods. By examining a few examples of the possible eavesdropper threats that can occur in VLC systems, this article offers novel insights into the vulnerabilities of state-of-the-art PLS schemes for VLC systems. Although the focus of the paper is mostly on these weaknesses, some potential solutions are also briefly proposed with a view to stimulating discourse in the community.

Highlights

  • Over the past few decades, the acceleration of the development of mobile devices, such as smart-phones, tablet computers, wearable devices, and Internet of Things devices, provoked a higher demand for data traffic via wireless communication

  • visible light communication (VLC) is viewed as a complementary technology to other radio frequency (RF) wireless communication technologies, such as Wi-Fi, mobile networks, mmWave communications, etc., rather than a RF replacement

  • This article argued that existing physical layer security (PLS) techniques for visible light communication (VLC) systems are still susceptible to various eavesdropping attacks

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Summary

Introduction

Over the past few decades, the acceleration of the development of mobile devices, such as smart-phones, tablet computers, wearable devices, and Internet of Things devices, provoked a higher demand for data traffic via wireless communication. VLC utilizes visible light, the spectrum of which ranges from 400 THz to 700 THz and is license free; VLC can be exploited for high-speed indoor wireless communication [1]. Since visible light cannot penetrate an opaque wall, a VLC system can offer high security at the physical layer. As one of many network security approaches, physical layer security (PLS) is a set of techniques that enables a transmitter and a legitimate receiver to securely communicate by utilizing the randomness of the channel between the transmitter and the receiver [3,4]. In RF systems, various PLS transmission techniques that allow better signal reception at an intended receiver by utilizing multiple antennas were proposed, and their informationtheoretic security performances were analyzed [5].

Differences in RF and VLC Security Environments
Vulnerabilities of Physical Layer Security in VLC Systems
Beamforming
Artificial Jamming
Cooperative Eavesdroppers in Multiuser VLC Systems
Future Directions
Conclusions

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