Challenges and recent progress in the governance of biosecurity risks in the era of synthetic biology

Abstract

Considerable progress has been achieved in basic research and the biotechnological application of biological sciences in recent years. Synthetic biology integrates systems biology, engineering, computer science, and other disciplines to achieve the “modification of life” or even the “creation of life” via the redesign of existing natural systems or the development of new biological components and devices. However, the research and application of synthetic biology can create potential risks, such as aggravation of species with complex gene modifications, threats to species diversity, abuse of biological weapons, laboratory leaks, and man-made mutations. Without a suitable governance system, such research activities could result in harm to humans, plants, and animals, as well as to natural ecological systems. In this article, we first briefly summarize technical progress in synthetic biology in recent years and the potential bioethical and biosecurity risks, and then describe current international treaties, guidance documents, and national regulatory measures designed to address potential harm caused by the dual-use property of synthetic biology, including the Biological Weapons Convention, the Convention on Biological Diversity, and the Model Code of Conduct for Biological Scientists (Tianjin Biosecurity Guidelines for Codes of Conduct for Scientists). In addition, we also present some recommendations for better governance of synthetic biology research and applications in China, including strengthening the biosecurity capacity, improving the biosecurity regulatory system, and promoting multilevel international cooperation to effectively address the potential biosecurity risks of synthetic biology.