Abstract
This paper argues that the course and outcome of the post-1993 financial reform in Korea were largely influenced by the interest politics of the most powerful interest group in Korea, chaebols, and thus an examination of their influence is essential to understanding the cause of Korea’s financial crisis of 1997-98. The paper concludes that a financial reform undertaken in a haphazard manner, manipulated by a few dominant players in the economy runs into the danger of producing an outcome worse than before.
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