Abstract

Development of Internet of Vehicles (IoV) has aroused extensive attention in recent years. The IoV requires an efficient communication mode when the application scenarios are complicated. To reduce the verifying time and cut the length of signature, certificateless aggregate signature (CL‐AS) is used to achieve improved performance in resource‐constrained environments like vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs), which is able to make it effective in environments constrained by bandwidth and storage. However, in the real application scenarios, messages should be kept untamed, unleashed, and authentic. In addition, most of the proposed schemes tend to be easy to attack by signers or malicious entities which can be called coalition attack. In this paper, we present an improved certificateless‐based authentication and aggregate signature scheme, which can properly solve the coalition attack. Moreover, the proposed scheme not only uses pseudonyms in communications to prevent vehicles from revealing their identity but also achieves considerable efficiency compared with state‐of‐the‐art work, certificateless signature (CLS), and CL‐AS schemes. Furthermore, it demonstrates that when focused on the existential forgery on adaptive chosen message attack and coalition attack, the proposed schemes can be proved secure. Also, we show that our scheme exceeds existing certification schemes in both computing and communication costs.

Highlights

  • With the rapid development of communication technology, various vehicles with powerful smart devices can communicate with each other. Such a novel application has aroused extensive interest in the society. This kind of application is commonly referred to as vehicle ad hoc networks (VANETs), which can provide guarantee for the distance between vehicles and reduce the probability of vehicle collision accidents, help car drivers navigate in real time, and improve the efficiency of traffic operation by communicating with other vehicles and network systems [1]

  • The vehicle can communicate with each other or with roadside unit (RSU) using a pseudonym, and no one can obtain the true identity of the vehicle except for the trusted authority (TA)

  • Our main contributions in this paper are as follows: (i) Prove that Kamil et al.’s schemes are not secure enough to defend against attacks from malicious vehicles and propose a solution to settle the problem (ii) Propose an improved certificateless-based authentication and aggregate signature scheme in VANETs, and prove that the scheme can perfectly resist the coalition attacks and its correctness (iii) Use the efficiency analysis and simulation to show the superiority of our scheme in efficiency and practicality

Read more

Summary

Introduction

With the rapid development of communication technology, various vehicles with powerful smart devices can communicate with each other Such a novel application has aroused extensive interest in the society. Kumar et al [3] proposed an efficient scheme using path signature to resist Sybil attack. Jiang et al [4] proposed an anonymous authentication scheme (AAAS) in VANETs, which adopts group signature mechanism to provide more efficient anonymous authentication service for vehicles. (i) Prove that Kamil et al.’s schemes are not secure enough to defend against attacks from malicious vehicles and propose a solution to settle the problem (ii) Propose an improved certificateless-based authentication and aggregate signature scheme in VANETs, and prove that the scheme can perfectly resist the coalition attacks and its correctness (iii) Use the efficiency analysis and simulation to show the superiority of our scheme in efficiency and practicality.

Related Works
Preliminaries
Forking Lemma
Our Proposed CLS and CL-AS Schemes
Aggregate 7 AggregateVerify n n n
Performance and Security Analysis
Conclusion

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.