Abstract
AbstractThis study investigates the effects of CEO hometown ties on corporate tax avoidance. The results show that CEO hometown ties to local government officials have a significantly positive impact on tax avoidance for private firms in China. We also find that the hometown ties effect is more pronounced in cities with weak public governance and in cities whose municipal Party committee secretaries are promoted from the same city, whereas the effect is weak in cities whose municipal Party committee secretaries are transferred from other places. In summary, our results suggest that hometown ties as an important political resource can facilitate connected private firms to obtain more economic resources from government.
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