Abstract
In the current study, the authors explored how CEO greed concerning bonuses and rewards on restricted stock affects a firm's environmental performance (EP) in environmentally sensitive sectors of China. Moreover, they empirically tested the constraining role of the quad director on the relationship between CEO greed and EP. Findings indicate that (a) CEO greed negatively affects the strategic firm's environmental performance, particularly the negative relation is augmented by the person-pay interactionism rationale (bonus), (b) the presence of one quad director in the board does not constrain CEO greed and EP negative relation, and (c) the presence of two or more quad directors in the board significantly constraints the negative relation between CEO greed and EP. Thus, having at least two quad directors is more effective than combining directors with multiple features. Our results are robust to different CEOs' power dynamics. Our research has important practical implications for corporate governance and business strategy formulation.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callMore From: International Journal of Asian Business and Information Management
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
