Abstract
Recent studies suggest that the conventional measure of cash holdings used to capture managerial risk-aversion may be inadequate. Using a new measure of physical cash, which adequately captures managerial risk-aversion, we deduce that female CEOs exhibit risk-aversion not only by maintaining higher physical cash levels but also by adopting risk-reducing policies. These risk-averse policies may be detrimental for some shareholders (despite evidence that female executives reduce agency conflicts) and they may impact the demand for female CEOs in the CEO labor markets. Our results are robust and lend support to the contention that female risk-aversion exists even beyond the “glass-ceiling”.
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