Abstract
AbstractFamily firms often opt for a combined CEO and board chair positions, yet the implications of such leadership structure on firm performance remain a subject of scholarly debate. We introduce the socioemotional wealth (SEW) perspective as a unifying framework that bridges the divergent views of stewardship and agency theories. We argue that the effects of CEO duality on performance are contingent upon the balance between extended and restricted SEW priorities. Drawing on a sample of listed companies on the Milan Stock Exchange between 2003 and 2015, our empirical analysis reveals that listed family firms derive greater benefits from CEO duality compared to their non‐family counterparts. Moreover, our findings demonstrate that such leadership structure renders the highest performance benefits in listed family firms when the CEO–chair is not a family member, particularly during periods of economic crisis.
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