Abstract

The adoption of information and communication technology (ICT) based centralized volt-var control (VVC) leads to an optimal operation of a distribution feeder. However, it also poses a challenge that an adversary can tamper with the metered data and thus can render the VVC action ineffective. Distribution system state estimation (DSSE) acts as a backbone of centralized VVC. Distributed energy resources (DER) injection measurements constitute leverage measurements from a DSSE point of view. This paper proposes two solutions as a volt var optimization-distribution system state estimation (VVO-DSSE) malicious attack mitigating strategy when the DER injection measurements are compromised. The first solution is based on local voltage regulation controller set-points. The other solution effectively employs historical data or forecast information. The concept is based on a cumulant based probabilistic optimal power flow with the objective of minimizing the expectation of total power losses. The effectiveness of the approach is performed on the 95-bus UK generic distribution system (UKGDS) and validated against Monte Carlo simulations.

Highlights

  • M ODERN power systems are rapidly integrating growing capacity of renewable generations

  • Under the draft revised IEEE Standard 1547.8, the PVs are allowed to participate in the voltage and var control through reactive power support and active power regulation

  • Once the bad data is detected by the diagnostic robust generalized potential (DRGP)-generalized studentized residual (GSR) methodology, as discussed in Section II, the distribution network operator (DNO) needs to mitigate the effect of bad leverage data without eliminating them

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Summary

INTRODUCTION

M ODERN power systems are rapidly integrating growing capacity of renewable generations. Based on the estimated states the DMS runs a volt var optimization algorithm to determine the optimal control set-points of the system These set-points are typically voltage, on load tap changer (OLTC) set-points, and PV inverter reactive injection settings etc. Under the draft revised IEEE Standard 1547.8, the PVs are allowed to participate in the voltage and var control through reactive power support and active power regulation. This necessitates over-sizing of PV inverters [9], [10]. The paper is structured as follows – Section II discusses the possible attack strategies to influence the measurements and gives a brief description of bad data detection techniques.

Cyber Attacks and Attack Scenarios
Detection of Bad Measurement Data
VOLT VAR OPTIMIZATION STRATEGY WITH BAD DATA
Problem Formulation
Mitigation of Malicious Attacks
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
Case1: At Peak Solar Power Output
Case2: At Peak Load Demand
CONCLUSION
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