Centralization via Delegation: The Long-Term Implications of the Israeli Arrangements Laws

Abstract

The “Arrangements Law” has become one of the most powerful policy tools used by the Israeli government since 1985. Under this omnibus legislation, the Budgets Department at the Ministry of Finance (MOF) introduces various bills and amendments in various policy areas almost on an annual basis. While previous studies presented how the MOF reached a powerful position in the policymaking process through this institutional architecture, this chapter examines how the MOF has also sought control in the everyday regulatory processes. More specifically, the chapter examines the extent to which the Arrangements Law authorized ministers to issue regulations (e.g., secondary legislation), based on a content analysis of 38 Arrangements laws legislated between 1985 and 2018. This chapter shows that against the conventional wisdom, the process of delegation of authority from parliament to the executive is a process that centralizes, rather than decentralizes, regulatory powers. In particular, the MOF was involved in nearly 60 percent of all delegations through four mechanisms of centralization: (1) vesting itself with an authority to create regulation; (2) vesting itself and another ministry with a joint authority to create regulation; and holding veto power over the regulations of other ministries either by requiring (3) its consent or (4) consultation prior to publication. Altogether, these mechanisms extended the MOF’s power in everyday regulatory processes.