Centrality and power revisited: actor success in group decision making

Abstract

For many years, network analysts viewed positional centrality as a source of social power. More recently, laboratory studies of exchange networks have called the centrality–power link into question: under zero-sum exchange conditions, the ability of certain actors to directly exploit others has been found to account for power independent of actors' centrality. But most observers believe that in non-zero-sum communication networks, centrality should positively affect power. In this study we examine the effect of centrality on power in a communication network involving group voting on political issues. Using a model in which actors' votes are determined by the strength of their initial positions and the social pressures to which they are subjected, we conduct computer simulations to examine the extent to which actors in various network positions achieve favorable political outcomes. Our findings indicate that the link between centrality and power is highly contingent on the structure of the network. In networks with a central actor and an odd number of subgroups, central actors fail to dominate. In fact, in these networks, when peripheral actors are able to directly influence one another, the central actor becomes the least powerful in the network. In networks with a central actor and an even number of subgroups, however, the central actor dominates even in situations with connected peripherals. The highly contingent effect of centrality on power accords with the findings of exchange theorists who have studied power under zero-sum conditions. This raises questions about the nature of the distinction between communication and exchange networks.