Central banking, free banking, and financial crises

Abstract

In the Keynesian view, the central bank is a part of an extramarket remedy to a market malady. Investment markets are inherently unstable; government control of the economy's money supply is an important element in macroeconomic stabilization policy. The case against central banking—and for free banking—reverses the characterization of both remedy and malady. Free banking is a part of a market remedy to an extramarket malady. Even this stark reversal understates the case for free banking. It would remain valid even if we take the dramatic and chronic fiscal irresponsibility of the Treasury as given. Periodic crises that will inevitably occur in such a debt-ridden economic environment would be more ably countered by the market forces of free banking than by the policy moves of a central bank. But the extent of the Treasury's fiscal irresponsibility is itself dependent upon whether the Treasury can count on an accommodating central bank. Free banking limits the scope of this potential source of instability while at the same time enhancing the market's ability to deal with whatever instabilities that may persist.