Abstract
Some academic literature maintains that high independent central banks are characterised by low democratic accountability. In this paper, we try to improve previous studies' evidence, using an alternative central bank independence index, which we suggest, in the updated measurement of a larger sample of thirty-three central banks. We confirm conclusions achieved by those previous studies, showing evidence for a de jure negative correlation between central bank independence and democratic accountability. Finally, we suggest how to improve the picture, by increasing accountability, with minimum losses in independence. After all, we recommend independent and accountable central banks.
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