Abstract
In a monetary union the central bank constitution must distribute the power over monetary policy between the members and the administrative center of the union. We compare alternative distributions and evaluate their performance. Dominance of regional interests always leads to inefficient monetary stabilization policies. Whether or not dominance of regional interests leads to a higher long-run rate of inflation depends on the union's political constitution.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
