Abstract
Over the past two decades of independent history, the Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) have developed pragmatic and largely non-ideological national security strategies rooted in their perceptions and prioritization of the complex regional realities. The states' attempts to match their military and security services capabilities to handle a variety of external and internal security challenges highlights the fact that the Central Asian states regard these capabilities as critical elements of hard power. At the same time, while often utilized to help quell various sources of domestic instability, all Central Asian militaries have lacked up-to-date operational experience. A review of their tactical proficiency in dealing with internal conflicts shows that although Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have contained socio-political unrest better than Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, all the states struggled to reform and adapt their armed forces to successfully deliver on their doctrinal obligations. This is because they have remained largely outside of contemporary international military interventions such as Operation Iraqi Freedom, the International Security Assistance Force or Kosovo Forces.This paper outlines the national security objectives of the Central Asian states and analyzes available information on the size, funding, combat readiness and the overall performance of the militaries in recent domestic conflicts. In attempting to effectively respond to the security challenges envisioned in the respective national defense strategies and doctrines, all Central Asian militaries have often struggled with fundamental operational issues and acted in similarly heavy-handed fashion. The continuous balancing of Russian, U.S. and Chinese regional security agendas aided by reform and modernization of the armed services are important to ensuring the Central Asian militaries' successes in fulfilling their current doctrinal obligations. An examination of the great magnitude of challenges faced by the Kyrgyz and Tajik militaries reveals a particularly compelling explanation for their strategic reliance on Russia in the event of a state emergency.The collective Central Asian military experience of handling recent internal instabilities suggests that as long as a military establishment is capable of containing security challenges in a relatively short period of time and without causing politically unacceptable casualties, it is unlikely to undergo major structural changes. Provided these states' stability is maintained and a restive area resumes government control, a combination of significant operational setbacks, lack of tactical expertise and human rights abuses is not bound to cause a sweeping reformation of the armed forces and security services. At the same time, internalization of the sum of all the operational experiences and lessons learned can be expected to influence national geopolitical choices insofar as prompting a country to seek allies most willing to assist it with meeting its key security and military modernization needs. For players outside the region such as the United States and Europe, a rationale for maintaining the current level of regional engagements in Central Asia becomes an almost Clausewitzian derivative of their broader geopolitical strategies. While far from harboring any Great Game type of ambitions, continued Western involvement in Central Asia, including in the realm of security cooperation, helps the West gain additional avenues of cooperation with China, possess at least moderate influence over Russian ambitions in the latter's near abroad and, in the case of robust security cooperation with Tajikistan, secure a potential engagement opportunity with Iran.Regional Threats and ChallengesAs identified by contemporary Uzbek political expert Shavkat Arifhanov, at a broad regional level all Central Asian states look at their military and security structures in the context of the following threats and concerns: border security focused on post-ISAF Afghanistan and prevention of the flow of terrorists, narcotics and weapons from Afghanistan into the region (as a source of instability, post-ISAF Afghanistan has the least relevance for Kazakhstan); containing the threat of homegrown and externally-supported religious extremists; preventing escalation of interregional tensions in the potential conflict zone of the Fergana valley (for Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan) and responding to domestic, social and ethnic unrest caused by increasing unemployment and deteriorating living conditions. …
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