CDS contract initiations: REIT board monitoring and corporate decision outcomes

Abstract

AbstractIn this article, we investigate whether the negative creditor governance shock due to the initiation of credit default swap (CDS) contracts results in monitoring substitution effects between bondholders and shareholders. Using several mechanisms to test increased shareholder monitoring such as board structure, CEO–chair duality, and institutional ownership, we show that shareholder monitoring increases post‐CDS contract initiation. We examine board decision outcomes and show that incentive compensation is higher for real estate investment trusts (REITs) post‐CDS initiation. Furthermore, we find that post‐CDS initiation, REITs undertake more acquisitions that are more likely to be paid for with stocks and take longer to complete than non‐REITs. Finally, we find that REITs industry‐adjusted cash holdings and dividend yield increases post‐CDS initiation.