CDMA System Design and Capacity Analysis Under Disguised Jamming

Abstract

This paper considers robust code division multiple access (CDMA) system design and capacity analysis under disguised jamming, where the jammer generates a fake signal using the same spreading code, constellation, and pulse shaping filter as that of the authorized signal. Unlike Gaussian jamming, which is destructive only when jamming is dominant, disguised jamming can be devastating even if the jamming power is comparable to the signal power. In this paper, first, we analyze the performance of the conventional CDMA under disguised jamming, and show that due to the symmetricity between the authorized signal and the jamming interference, the receiver cannot really distinguish the authorized signal from jamming, leading to complete communication failure. Second, we propose to combat disguised jamming using secure scrambling. Instead of using conventional scrambling codes, we apply advanced encryption standard to generate the security-enhanced scrambling codes. Theoretical analysis based on the arbitrarily varying channel model shows that the capacity of conventional CDMA without secure scrambling under disguised jamming is actually zero; however, secure scrambling can break the symmetricity between the authorized signal and the jamming interference, and hence ensures positive channel capacity under disguised jamming. Numerical examples are provided to demonstrate the effectiveness of secure scrambling in combating disguised jamming.