Abstract
Abstract This chapter examines Shepherd’s objections to Humean causation. After a brief overview of Hume’s account of causation, the chapter proceeds through the first four of six points Shepherd makes in opposition to Hume: that we know through reason, not “custom,” the causal principle that every object that begins to exist must have a cause other than itself; that we also know through reason, not custom, that causes that are similar to each other will necessarily have effects that are similar to each other; that Shepherd can offer a better definition of ‘cause’ than Hume; and that Hume’s definitions of ‘cause’ are flawed in several respects. In the course of surveying her objections, the chapter introduces Shepherd’s own novel theory of causation as synchronous necessary connection.
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