Abstract
Cognitive factors are known to influence lay assessments of causality and blame for negative side effects of intentional actions but specific social determinants of such assessments remain relatively unexplored. In a full-factorial, intraindividual experiment using two blocks of analogous vignettes constructed for two particular institutional action domains (“medical” and “corporate dress code”), we tested the propositions that causality and blame judgments differ between (a) domains and depend on (b) the type of action originator; (c) the type of damage; and (d) the “remoteness” of damage from the originator. Our data demonstrate a significant difference between two institutional action domains: actors in “medical”-related vignettes are generally estimated to be more causally effective and blameworthy than actors in “dress code”–related vignettes. In addition to the pronounced main effects of institutional domain as a factor influencing cause and blame judgments, we revealed few significant interaction effects of the latter with other experimental factors used for vignettes construction.
Highlights
Evaluation of accidental damage from an intentional legitimate action has been the subject of long debate among law scholars
We studied how people presented with factorial vignettes depicting everyday scenarios judge an actor’s blameworthiness and causal role depending on institutional domain where everyday scenarios are taking place, on the action-originator type, “remoteness” of damage from its originator and type of negative side effect
One institutional domain described adverse situations that emerged during the purchase of medication, and the other described situations connected to the negative side effects of implementing a dress code in an Factor Y: Type of damage
Summary
Evaluation of accidental damage from an intentional legitimate action has been the subject of long debate among law scholars They usually consider the concept of criminal liability for negligence as a part of “a more general theory of responsibility for action” and assumed that “the criminal law is another form of ordinary, non-criminal responsibility” Folk psychology versus folk sociology in judgments of blame and cause: Institutional domains As it has been shown before (Cova et al, 2016; Guglielmo & Malle, 2010; Knobe, 2003; see Knobe et al, 2012), a perceiver’s judgments concerning the intentionality of the side effects of intentional actions depend on his or her evaluations of the negative and positive outcomes of the action and the actor’s conscious intentions and on the perceiver’s view of the subjective desirability of expected externalities for the actor and actor’s ability to control them. It appears that actors are often considered by others as exempt from obligations to prevent such “remote” damage even in a case of non-negligible likelihood of the negative outcome
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