Causal Strength

Abstract

The question “When is C a cause of E?” is well-studied in philosophy—much more than the equally important issue of quantifying the causal strength between C and E. In this chapter, we transfer methods from Bayesian Confirmation Theory to the problem of explicating causal strength. We develop axiomatic foundations for a probabilistic theory of causal strength as difference-making and proceed in three steps: First, we motivate causal Bayesian networks as an adequate framework for defining and comparing measures of causal strength. Second, we demonstrate how specific causal strength measures can be derived from a set of plausible adequacy conditions (method of representation theorems). Third, we use these results to argue for a specific measure of causal strength: the difference that interventions on the cause make for the probability of the effect. An application to outcome measures in medicine and discussion of possible objections concludes the chapter.