Causal exclusion without causal sufficiency

Bram Vaassen

doi:10.1007/s11229-020-02723-y

Abstract

Some non-reductionists claim that so-called ‘exclusion arguments’ against their position rely on a notion of causal sufficiency that is particularly problematic. I argue that such concerns about the role of causal sufficiency in exclusion arguments are relatively superficial since exclusionists can address them by reformulating exclusion arguments in terms of physical sufficiency. The resulting exclusion arguments still face familiar problems, but these are not related to the choice between causal sufficiency and physical sufficiency. The upshot is that objections to the notion of causal sufficiency can be answered in a straightforward fashion and that such objections therefore do not pose a serious threat to exclusion arguments.

Highlights

Some philosophers maintain that so-called exclusion arguments support the conclusion that only physical phenomena can cause physical effects
I will argue that these concerns about the role of causal sufficiency in exclusion arguments are relatively superficial
Causal Exclusion For any three phenomena A, B and C: if A occurs at t and is a sufficient cause for B’s occurrence at t + x, no phenomenon C occurring at t that is distinct from A and is distinct from all of A’s parts is a cause of B, unless it is a case of genuine overdetermination

Summary

Introduction

Some philosophers maintain that so-called exclusion arguments support the conclusion that only physical phenomena can cause physical effects. These philosophers argue that non-reductionist theories of the mind cannot allow mental phenomena to be causes of physical effects (Kim 1989, 2005; Ney 2012; Papineau 2002).1 Nonreductionists often claim that such exclusion arguments rely on a problematic notion of causal sufficiency.

Results

Conclusion