Causal Evidence and Causal Explanations

Abstract

AbstractChapter 2 has presented the core features of mechanistic explanations, some of its uses in medical contexts, and a few issues discussed in the recent debate, concerning, on the one hand, processual notions and, on the other hand, relations between epistemic and ontic stances. This chapter specifically addresses epistemological distinctions that have been drawn with regard to what counts as causal evidence, and how it can be employed in the assessment of genuine causal relations – versus mere correlations. We will first recall some aspects of the philosophical debate, mostly concerned with the Evidence-Based Medicine movement, on statistical and mechanistic evidence, what they are, and how they can be distinguished and complemented. We will then dwell on a couple of specific case studies, which will allow to shed further light on how causal evidence can be understood – and misunderstood. Although it is no doubt related also to other epistemological goals (for instance, to classificatory and predictive activities), causal evidence, its status and weight, are clearly relevant for explanatory purposes.