Causal and Historical Explanation

Abstract

In the discussion between the analytical philosophy of science and dialectics there has recently been a remarkable change. At the same time as the latest debate about method was staged in German sociology on inverted positions, with essentially ideological arguments and culminating in the misleading confrontation of a double positivism,1 a change of argumentation was made within analytical philosophy, largely hidden from the participants of the so-called positivism debate. It is focused on the analytical philosophy of action, or, more precisely: the interest in the concept of action and in the logic of practical argumentation has been growing in the analytical philosophy of science as a result of the realization that the foundations of social and historical sciences were so far insufficiently clarified. The change originated thus in the analytical philosophy of history. The debate upon the methodical basis of the historical sciences2 dissolved the traditional positivistic frame of mind in analytical philosophy and put into motion the well worn fronts in the discussion of the philosophy of science. Analytical philosophy of history — as has been shown by the long controversy about the suggestion from Hempel/Op- penheim for a comprehensive theory of explanation (Covering Law- Model)3 — is only possible under restriction of the analytical program.