Abstract
AbstractThe aim of this paper is to give a new interpretation of Aristotle's account of the emotions evoked in the course of engaging with tragic narratives that would give rise to a coherent account of catharsis. Very briefly, the proposal is that tragedy triggers vicarious (or other‐centered) emotions and catharsis is the purgation of such emotions. I argue that this interpretation of “fear and pity” as vicarious emotions is consistent with both Aristotle's account of emotions and his account of catharsis and also with his choice of examples for tragedies that trigger catharsis.
Highlights
Aristotle somewhat cryptically says that tragedy is the “mimesis of a serious and complete action, having magnitude [...], which through pity and fear bring about a catharsis of such emotions” (Poetics 6, 1449b24–28)
Some have despaired of the entire endeavor—as Voltaire suggested, if it is so difficult to find a coherent interpretation of this concept, why should we take such “gibberish about the purgation of emotions” (Voltaire 1764/1837, p. 337) seriously? But dismissing Aristotle's account of catharsis do not have to go as far as Voltaire's provocative statement—it often takes a milder form
I will argue that if we accept a richer account of emotions than the one normally present in the discussion of catharsis, we may be able to give an account of catharsis that is consistent with Aristotle's account of emotions, his account of catharsis, and, importantly, explains his choice of examples for tragedies that trigger catharsis
Summary
Aristotle somewhat cryptically says that tragedy is the “mimesis of a serious and complete action, having magnitude [...], which through pity and fear bring about a catharsis of such emotions” (Poetics 6, 1449b24–28).1 There is a library‐ sized literature devoted to almost every word in this sentence—what is meant by “fear and pity?” What is meant by “catharsis?” What is meant by “such?” And so on.As a result, some have despaired of the entire endeavor—as Voltaire suggested, if it is so difficult to find a coherent interpretation of this concept, why should we take such “gibberish about the purgation of emotions” (Voltaire 1764/1837, p. 337) seriously? But dismissing Aristotle's account of catharsis do not have to go as far as Voltaire's provocative statement—it often takes a milder form. While engaging with the tragic narrative, she is in a different emotional state, namely, the one characterized by fear and pity.
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