Categorization and systematization of institutionally- procedural and politically-behavioral attributes and features of semi-presidentialism: theoretical and methodological cut

Abstract

The article is devoted to theoretical and methodological categorization and systematization of institutionally-procedural and politically-behavioral attributes and features of semi-presidentialism. The author identified at least two groups of causes and factors, i.e. exogenous and endogenous, that define and categorize semi-presidentialism: the actual content of a constitution, the combination of traditions and circumstances (exogenous causes and factors), the composition of parliamentary majority and the position of a president in relation to parliamentary majority (endogenous causes and factors). It was motivated that, within the same constitutional delineation, a specific semi-presidential country can be classified in practice, first of all in the cut of varying institutional rules and formal/actual powers of presidents, governmental cabinets/ prime ministers and parliaments. The researcher found out that taking into account the place and role of political institutions in inter-party competition and party hierarchy has a significant influence on this process. That is why semi-presidentialism was generalized as a system of government, which is comprehensively updated and taxonomied formally and actually. At the same time, it was recorded that semi-presidentialism uses specific hierarchical and transactional relations in the triangle “the head of state–governmental cabinet–parliament”. Their combination affects the formal and actual positioning and taxonomy of different types of heterogeneous semi-presidentialism. It was generalized that semi-presidentialism is definitively and permanently characterized with: a restrained and moderate model of separation of powers and appropriate system of checks and balances; popular election of a president for a fixed term; the collective responsibility of a prime minister and a cabinet to a legislature; the actual “securitization” of a president from interference in his or her activities by other institutions and branches of state power; actual (or at least formal), but multi-step and different deconcentration or dualization of the executive between a president (the head of state) and a prime minister (the head of governmental cabinet); double or dual nature of the origin and implementation of the executive, but not a double or dual nature of the responsibility of the executive.