Categorical Imperatives--A Defense

Abstract

IN her paper, Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives,' Mrs. Foot argues against the view that moral considerations provide reasons for acting for any man, which she takes be at the heart of the claim that moral judgments are categorical imperatives (I shall follow her in referring this view as the view that moral judgments are categorical imperatives). Her own position is that whether or not moral considerations provide any individual with reason act depends on whether or not he happens care for moral ends (p. 315), and she attributes the feeling that moral requirements are somehow inescapable the relative stringency with which morality is taught (p. 310). I will argue that the view that moral judgments are in fact categorical imperatives is untouched by her attack. Having concluded that what is meant by those who hold that moral judgments are categorical imperatives is that moral considerations give reasons for acting any man, unlike others which only provide one with reasons act if one has certain interests and desires, Mrs. Foot says that the difficulty is to defend this proposition which is more often repeated than explained (p. 309). She says,