Catalysis, Functional Explanations and Functionalism in Psychology

Abstract

Catalysis, which is normally applied in chemistry, is regarded to have explanatory power in psychology as well (Beckstead et al., Generalizing Through Conditional Analysis: Systemic Causality in the World of Eternal Becoming, 2009). This chapter is investigating to what extent this may be true. In this respect, the term is evaluated on the background of two crossing lines: sorts of explanation and sufficient or necessary reasons. Catalysis is primarily to be regarded as a functional explanation. Yet, by investigating how this type of functional explanation is applied in chemistry, biology and social sciences, the conclusion is that there are several types of functional explanations and catalysis can be related to a couple of them. The prototype of functional explanation is to be defined in terms of natural selection in biology. This is different from the functional aspect of catalysis in chemistry. A third type is functionalism in psychology. On this background, the chapter investigates and sorts out six different types of explanations that are relevant for achieving an understanding of catalysis, which is also regarded to be one of them. In addition, we have “causality”, “functional explanation”, “intentional explanation”, “functionalism” and “understanding”. However, the conclusion of this investigation is that explanations are primarily tools for making meaning, but they represent different levels of precision. On this background, catalysis may have explanatory power in psychology, but in a different way, and with a lower level of precision compared with how it is applied in chemistry.