Cash transfers increase trust in local government

David K Evans,Brian Holtemeyer,Katrina Kosec

doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2018.08.020

David K Evans, Brian Holtemeyer + Show 1 more

Open Access

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2018.08.020

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Abstract

How does a locally-managed conditional cash transfer program impact trust in government? On the one hand, delivering monetary benefits and increasing interactions with government officials (elected and appointed) may increase trust. On the other hand, it can be difficult for citizens to know to whom to attribute a program and reward with greater trust. Further, imposing paternalistic conditions, and possibly prompting citizens to experience feelings of social stigma or guilt could reduce trust. This study answers this question by exploiting the randomized introduction of a locally-managed transfer program in Tanzania in 2010, which included popular election of community management committees to run the program. The analysis reveals that cash transfers can significantly increase trust in leaders. This effect is driven by large increases in trust in elected leaders as opposed to appointed bureaucrats. Perceptions of government responsiveness to citizens' concerns and honesty of leaders also rise, and these improvements are largest where there are more village meetings at baseline. One of the central roles of village meetings is to receive and share information with village residents, providing some evidence on the value of a high-information environment for generating trust in government. The study also finds that records from school and health committees are more readily available in treatment villages. Notably, while stated willingness of citizens to participate in community development projects rises, actual participation in projects and the likelihood of voting do not. Overall, the results suggest little reason to worry that local management of a conditional cash transfer program reduces trust in government or the quality of governance—especially in high-information contexts.

Highlights

How does government provision of social protection impact trust in government, and how does the quality of information available to citizens moderate this relationship? The very existence of government is often predicated on its ability to protect citizens’ well-being
Can an effective cash transfer program overcome this overall trend of declining trust? And how does the quality of information available to citizens moderate this relationship? We consider these questions in the context of a cash transfer program piloted in Tanzania in 2010—a country that experienced declining trust during 2008–2012 (Afrobarometer, 2008, 2012)
We contend that a key factor moderating how receipt of social protection affects trust in government is the availability of information—on government decision-making broadlyspeaking, as well as on the program. We empirically examine both the question of how government provision of social protection impacts trust in government, and how information moderates the relationship, in the context of Tanzania’s pilot, community-managed conditional cash transfer program

Summary

Introduction

How does government provision of social protection impact trust in government, and how does the quality of information available to citizens moderate this relationship? The very existence of government is often predicated on its ability to protect citizens’ well-being. A popular form of social protection, were ubiquitous in Latin America by the mid-2000s (Fiszbein and Schady, 2009), but just emerging in poorer, African countries. They have since exploded in Africa; by the 2010s, the vast majority of African countries had formally discussed, planned, or piloted a cash transfer program of some form (Garcia and Moore, 2012) Their expansion has coincided with a general decline in levels of trust across Africa, illustrated in Figure 1 using data from the full set of countries included in Afrobarometer surveys between 2005–2016. Decisions about development planning and budgeting are made at the district level (Venugopal and Yilmaz, 2010)

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